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Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is closely related to his Politics. Aristotle calls
his Ethics a politikÆ tiw or ‘sort of political science’, numerous times he empha-
sizes the practical nature of his inquiry, and the closing pages of the Ethics are
the introduction to the Politics; further, in numerous places the Ethics refers to
discussions which take place in the Politics, and the Politics, in turn, explicitly
refers to discussions in the Ethics.1 The two works taken together are a diptych or
greater whole composed of two parts. And yet, the fit between the two works is
not always smooth and sometimes it is unclear. Although both the Politics and
the Ethics raise the question of what is the best regime or constitution (≤ ér¤sth
polite¤a) in numerous places, it is difficult to determine the identity of the best
regime in the Politics. Although EN viii 10 explicitly endorses kingship
(basile¤a) as the best regime, many commentators agree with Richard Kraut’s
claim that ‘unfortunately Aristotle does not explicitly say why, here or else-
where’.2 Trying to reconcile what Aristotle says about the best regime in both the
Ethics and Politics simply complicates matters further.
Much work has been done on the question of what is the best regime in Aristo-
tle’s Politics, but the same question has received much less scrutiny in the case of
the Ethics.3 Although the Ethics is a kind of political science, for the most part it
ignores political regimes or constitutions to keep its applicability as wide as pos-
sible.4 Nonetheless, in EN viii 10 Aristotle claims that kingship is the best
regime, and elsewhere in the Ethics he makes remarks about regimes which yield
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1 For citations that allude to the unified nature of the Ethics and Politics—whether conceptually
or through textual cross-references—see EN 1094b11-12, 1095a3-4, 1095b5-7, 1102a8-27, 1103b2-
25, 1109b34-35, 1141b23-24, 1155a23-25, 1181b13-16, Pol. 1261a31, 1280a18, 1282b19, 1295a36,
1332a8, a21. See further Bodéüs 1993 and Vander Waerdt 1985a and 1991. My own translations of
the Greek are based on Bywater 1894 and Ross 1957, although I am much indebted to Irwin 1999 and
Rackham 1932.
2 Kraut 2002, 425; cf. Miller 1995, 153n27. A prominent commentary tradition on EN viii 10
found in Ramsauer 1878, Grant 1885, ii 269-270, and Stewart 1892, ii 306, dismisses the discussion
of regimes in the Ethics as an early work which Aristotle revised in the Politics. See further Gauthier
and Jolif 1970, ii 699.
3 For recent discussions of the notion of the best regime in the Politics, see Alexander 2000,
Bartlett 1994 and 1995, Bates 2003, Chuska 2000, and Huxley 1985.
4 Vander Waerdt 1985a, 82 puts the point well: ‘In presenting his teaching on political science,
Aristotle must avoid making his account of the individual’s moral education dependent upon the ends
and educational program of any particular regime, in order to take into account the variety of regimes
in which education takes place’ (see also Vander Waerdt 1991, 236).
coherent arguments for the claim that kingship is best.5 In order to clarify why
kingship is the best regime of the Ethics, I first examine Aristotle’s discussion in
EN viii 10. In part two I look at passages in the Ethics in which Aristotle distin-
guishes good and bad regimes and examine the criteria on which he bases the dis-
tinction. In the third part I argue that Aristotle’s use of kingship as a model for
the ordering of the soul supports and elucidates his claim that kingship is best. In
EN v 7, Aristotle claims that there is ‘one regime which is best everywhere
according to nature’ (1135a5); since the regime described in v 7 has been inter-
preted as involving direct civic participation, this passage appears to go against
my thesis. In the fourth part I show why such an interpretation is mistaken and
that, properly understood, EN v 7 in fact supports my claim that kingship is the
best regime of the Ethics. In the conclusion I consider the paradox: if humans are
perfected through political participation, then how can a regime like kingship—
which denies direct civic participation to its subjects—nonetheless be Aristotle’s
best regime?
I. The Ranking of Constitutions in EN viii 10
Ranking constitutions requires both a way to distinguish different kinds of con-
stitution and criteria by means of which to rank them.6 Both Politics iii 7 and EN
viii 10 divide regimes into six types: there are three ‘correct’ constitutions (Ùrya‹
polite¤ai), namely, kingship, aristocracy, and polity or timocracy,7 and there are
three regimes which are ‘deviations’ (parekbãseiw), namely, tyranny, oligarchy,
and democracy.8 The Politics and Ethics also agree that correct constitutions are
ruled in the interest of the ruled whereas deviant regimes are ruled in the interest
of the rulers.9
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5 EN 1160a31-37; cf. Pol. 1279a26-39. There is very little literature on the nature of kingship in
the Ethics. For analysis of kingship in the Politics, see: Bates 1997, Carlier 1993, Kelsen 1937, Miller
1998, Nagle 2000, Newell 1991, and Vander Waerdt 1985b.
6 Aristotle’s predecessors such as Herodotus, Plato, and Isocrates provided different ways to
divide constitutions, and there was significant disagreement over whether all regimes could be
reduced to two types (oligarchy and democracy), three types (monarchy, oligarchy and democracy),
or, with the addition of tyranny, aristocracy, and polity, possibly four, five, or even six types. See
Herodotus, Histories iii 80-82; Isocrates, Panathenaicus 132; Plato, Statesman 301a-303b, Republic
544b-d, Laws 712b8-715e; cf. Rhet. 1365b33-1366a3, Pol. 1290a12-29, 1293a35-b2. See further,
Newman 1887, i 203-220; DeRomilly 1959, Fortenbaugh 1991, and Rowe 2000.
7 The Ethics, unlike the Politics, calls a regime ruled by the many towards the common good
‘timocracy’ based on the fact that it has a property qualification (t¤mhma, EN 1160b18-20; cf. Rep.
545b). For possible historical reasons behind Aristotle’s terminological change, see DeRomilly 1959,
92-95. Ron Polansky has suggested to me that the Politics calls it ‘polity’ since it is really the best
regime, i.e., the real polite¤a. Throughout I will use the term timocracy rather than polity.
8 EN 1160a31-37, Pol. 1279a26-39; cf. EN 1131a28-29, EE 1241b27-33. In the Rhetoric Aristo-
tle claims that there are only four types of regimes (one of which, monarchy, admits of two species),
and in the Politics one can find passages which discuss two-fold and five-fold divisions (Rhet.
1365b33-1366a3, Pol. 1290a12-29, 1293a35-b2).
9 In the Politics, initially Aristotle differentiates regimes by quantitative criteria, viz., whether
one, few, or many rule; his subsequent analysis points out that the regimes are in fact differentiated by
The question of ranking regimes in the Politics is complicated because Aristo-
tle seems to identify a number of different regimes as ‘best’ without clearly inter-
relating them.10 Nonetheless, EN viii 10—where Aristotle examines the
analogies between constitutions and relations in the family—states that kingship
is best overall, tyranny is worst overall, and democracy is the least bad of the
deviant regimes.11 Aristotle supports ranking kingship as best with two explicit
arguments, both of which turn on the juxtaposition of tyranny and kingship as
being opposites (§nant¤a) on an evaluative scale. Aristotle’s first argument
asserts that whereas a tyrant looks to his own advantage in ruling, because a royal
ruler (basileÊw) is independent and lacks nothing he can look to the advantage
of those who are ruled (1160b2-6).12 Earlier, in EN viii 9, within a slightly differ-
ent context, Aristotle claimed that justice consists in the ‘common good’ (tÚ
koinª sumf°ron) and it appears that Aristotle’s first argument presupposes such
a doctrine, much like the differentiation of correct and deviant regimes in the
Politics (EN 1160a11-14; cf. Pol 1279a18-20, 1279a28-29). Certainly such an
argument allows one to rank kingship over tyranny, but it does not appear to jus-
tify ranking kingship as superior to aristocracy and timocracy.
Aristotle’s second argument appears to be intended to do such work. After
asserting that kingship and tyranny are opposites because one seeks the good of
the ruled whereas the other seeks the good of the ruler, Aristotle goes on to con-
clude ‘the superior badness (xeir¤sth) of tyranny among the other constitutions
is more evident, for the opposite (§nant¤on) of the best must be the worst (kãk-
iston)’.13 As Pakaluk 1999, 117 notes, ‘it looks as though Aristotle is arguing
that kingship and tyranny are “contrary extremes,” in the precise sense of “mem-
bers of the same kind which differ the most”’. Such an interpretation is supported
by the immediate sequel in the text, where Aristotle specifies a scheme of consti-
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qualitative criteria, viz., whether the rich or poor rule, i.e., the different sorts of ends (Pol. 1279a28-
32, 1279b35-1280a7). The Ethics does not pursue the question beyond asserting the six-fold division.
10 Politics iii and iv present the following possible candidates: Kingship (basile¤a), which is
the most fitting or just in certain circumstances (discussed in Pol. iii 14-17; Unmixed aristocracy, or
the best regime given the fulfillment of one’s prayers, in which the good man and good citizen are
one (discussed in Pol. vii-viii); The middle regime, in which the middle class outnumbers the rich and
poor (discussed in Pol. iv 11); The ‘mixed’ timocracy and aristocracy, or rule according to ‘relative’
virtue (discussed in Pol. iv 7-9); and the most common regimes—oligarchy and democracy—which
although both ‘deviant’ species of regimes, nonetheless contain internal rankings of higher and lower
subspecies (discussed in Pol. iv 3-6 and vi). See further Pol. 1288a33-38, 1289a38-b11, 1296b3-13,
1288b22-38; cf. 1276b36-38, 1284a2-4, 1284b26.
11 EN 1160a36-37, 1160b7-10, b20-23; cf. 1161b31-33, 1161b7-11. Although the Eudemian
Ethics does not endorse one regime as best, it does apparently endorse the claim that the aristocratic
association is best (EE 1241b35-38). For an explanation of the textual difficulties related to the pas-
sage, see Donini 1999, 153, 218. More generally, see Pakaluk 1998, 425.
12 On the notion that eÈerges¤a is a king’s proper virtue in Aristotle and other contemporary
authors, see Vander Waerdt 1985b, 264-265 n23.
13 1160b7-9. Scholars have been puzzled about whether this argument implies that the goodness
of kingship is made evident from the overwhelming badness of tyranny or vice versa. Regardless of
which version is endorsed, the argument still endorses the claim that kingship is best based on the
argument from opposites. For analysis of the problem, see Gauthier and Jolif 1970, ii 701.
tutional change (metabolÆ) which asserts that changes within kinds of opposites
(e.g., kingship to tyranny, aristocracy to oligarchy, and timocracy to democracy)
are most common because they involve the least amount of change.14 Indeed, the
remainder of Aristotle’s discussion of cities and households is concerned with
the juxtaposition of opposites rather than making comparisons between different
correct or deviant regimes (although compare 1161b9-11).
In sum, Aristotle’s discussion of constitutional regimes and households in EN
viii 10 supports the following claims. First, the Ethics, like the Politics, articu-
lates a six-fold division of regimes which separates different good and bad
regimes. Second, although the identity of the best regime in the Politics is hard to
determine, EN viii 10 unambiguously states that kingship is the best constitution.
Third, although Aristotle’s ranking is based primarily on the juxtaposition of
opposites that he provides, it also presupposes the criterion of the common good
as a means of dividing and ranking regimes. The Ethics articulates other criteria
for ranking regimes in addition to that of the common good.
II. Criteria for the Ranking of Constitutions in the Ethics
In EN viii 10 Aristotle divides correct and deviant regimes with reference to
the criterion of the common good or advantage of those ruled. Such a criterion
appears insufficient for ranking regimes internal to the divisions of correct and
deviant regimes. Although kingship is better than tyranny because it aims at the
common good, Aristotle seems not to use the common good as a metric to rank,
say, kingship over aristocracy or either regime over timocracy. As commentators
on the Politics have long recognized, Aristotle’s rankings within the classes of
legitimate or right regimes must be based on a criterion beyond the common
good as aim (Newman 1887, i 217-218, Barker 1959, 307-310, and Fortenbaugh
1991, 234-236). Such additional criteria are not only at play in the Politics,
though; one can find evidence of them in the Nicomachean Ethics. In addition to
the common good, Aristotle uses the notions of rule of law and virtue to rank dif-
ferent regimes.
The first criterion concerns whether a regime is one in which laws or men are
sovereign. Aristotle inherits such a notion from Plato’s Statesman, although Aris-
totle provides an apparent twist to the Platonic analysis of the question. In the
Statesman, the Stranger ponders which regime is better, one in which a superior
man rules or an aristocratic one in which law rules over individuals. Whereas the
Statesman endorses the claim of the superior man, Aristotle in his Politics seems
to side with the superiority of rule of law.15 But the discussion of rule of law in
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14 1160b10-23. Aristotle devotes almost all of Politics v to the subject of constitutional change
and revolution, and the analysis in viii 10 is admittedly brief and overly simplistic in comparison. See
esp. Pol. v 10-12; cf. 1286b4-27, 1295b38-1296a6.
15 Plato, Statesman 302b ff. In Politics iii 15-17 Aristotle presents the problem dialectically with
points raised on both sides of the question of whether a man or the law should rule. He appears to side
with the rule of law, although it is precisely the problem of the ‘king over all’ (pambasile¤a) which
causes confusion over Aristotle’s final answer to the question. See further Pol. 1287a23-33, 1288a25-
the Ethics goes in a different direction, namely, to the concept of virtue. Whereas
the notion of rule of law in the Politics champions the impartiality of law over the
human passions and self interest, in the Ethics rule of law is connected to the
common good and supreme virtue.16
In Ethics v 6, Aristotle articulates the concept of rule of law in his discussion
of political justice. Political justice exists only between free and equal individuals
living within a political society under the rule of law because it is law which dis-
tinguishes justice and injustice (1134a26-34; see further Lockwood 2006). In the
sequel, he goes on to state that ‘this is why we do not permit a man to rule, but
the law, because a man rules in his own interest, and becomes a tyrant; but the
ruler is a guardian of justice, and if of justice, then of equality’.17 Such remarks
seem to echo the notion of law in the Politics. But earlier, in his account of ‘com-
plete justice’ or the whole of virtue towards others, Aristotle makes use of the
same notion of law and connects it to the common good. He writes:
Since, as we saw, the lawless person is unjust and the lawful
person is just, it clearly follows that whatever is lawful is in
some way just; for the provisions of legislative science are law-
ful, and we say that each of them is just. In every matter that
they deal with, the laws aim either at the common benefit of
all, or at the benefit of those in control, whose control rests on
virtue or on some other such basis. And so in one way what we
call just is whatever produces and maintains happiness and its
parts for a political community.18
But, as Aristotle goes on to say, such law is correct only in the case that it
requires actions in accord with virtue and prohibits action in accord with vice
(EN 1137a10-13; cf. 1116a19-20, 1144a15, 1152a21-24). In other words, Aristo-
tle links the common good to the promotion of virtue through the notion of law.
But virtue is just the sort of criterion that one needs to make rankings internal to
the class of correct regimes.
In the discussion of ethical virtue in the Ethics, Aristotle suggests that virtue is
a criterion which specifies which regimes are more effective at bringing about
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29.
16 For the question of impartiality and rule of law in the Politics, see 1287a33, 1280a15-17,
1286a16-20, a34, 1287b4-5; cf. 1292a3-32, 1292b5-7, b11-22, 1292b27 ff., 1294a1-10, 1295a15-17,
1296b35-40. See further Miller 1995, 79-84.
17 EN 1134a35-b2. Manuscripts and editors have differed on whether at 1134a35 one should
read nÒmon (as in my translation) or lÒgon (following MS Mb). Since Aristotle often identifies nÒmow
with lÒgow (see, e.g., EN 1180a21-24, Pol. 1286a16-18, 1287a33), the difference may not be great.
18 EN 1129b11-19, Irwin 1999 follows Bywater 1894 and Jackson 1879 in rendering the Greek
as it is found in the manuscript tradition. Other editors and translators, such as Stewart 1892, Gauthier
and Jolif 1970, and Apostle 1984 have proposed emendations to the text on the presupposition that
the passage is intended to map onto the discussion of the common good in Pol. iii 7.1279a29-31,
although the terminology is slightly different. Although the passage is related to the division of
regimes in Politics iii 7, I follow Irwin because I do not believe that the argument requires Aristotle to
reproduce that division of regimes within this context.
the common good. The goal of political science is the highest good, but the incul-
cation of virtue amongst one’s citizens is the key instrument for obtaining that
goal (EN 1094a27-94b12). In Aristotle’s words, ‘we have stated that the supreme
Good was the end of political science, but the principal care of this science is to
produce a certain character in the citizens, namely to make them virtuous and
capable of performing noble actions’ (1099b29-1100a2; cf. 1102a5-16, 1152b1-
4). Since political scientists and regimes can be judged insofar as they obtain that
end, the regime best at inculcating virtue is the best regime. Aristotle puts the
point most explicitly in his discussion of the inculcation of ethical virtue.
We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temper-
ate acts, brave by doing brave acts. This truth is attested by the
experience of cities: lawgivers make the citizens good by train-
ing them in habits of right actions. This is the wish of every
legislator; if he fails to do it well he misses his goal. Correct
habituation distinguishes a good regime (polite¤a égayÆ)
from a bad one. (1103a34-b6)
Aristotle links the goodness of a regime to its stance towards virtue. Such a crite-
rion is not an alternative to the common good, but it allows for rankings within
the class of right regimes, since although kingship, aristocracy, and timocracy all
aim at the common good, they have different levels of virtue within their soci-
eties. Within the Politics, Aristotle makes clear that the closest timocracy can
come to virtue is a sort of martial virtue broadly available to all citizenry, but
aristocracy, with education and resources, can aspire to a higher level of virtue
(1283a19-23, 1288a6-15, 1291a21-28, 1295a25-36). Nothing Aristotle says
about education or civic involvement in the Nicomachean Ethics undermines
such theses from the Politics. But what is peculiar is that since the Ethics presents
kingship as a superior model of ethical inculcation, it appears to elevate kingship
above aristocracy and timocracy on the basis of the criterion of virtue.
III. Kingship as a Model in the Ethics
At several places in the Ethics, Aristotle provides kingship as a superior model
for the inculcation of ethical virtue. Of course, because kingship provides a supe-
rior model for ethical inculcation at various stages of one’s life, it does not follow
that kingship is the best regime. Being a model for virtue is not the same thing as
being a criterion to rank regimes.19 Nonetheless, Aristotle’s use of the model of
kingship helps explain the claim that kingship is the best regime. Thus, the fact
that Aristotle uses kingship as a superior model for virtue in the soul sheds light
on one reason kingship is superior to other regimes as far as the Ethics is con-
cerned.
Aristotle uses the model of kingship in two separate but interrelated ways in
the Ethics. On the one hand, when Aristotle discusses the relationship of the
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19 I am especially grateful to Ron Polansky for making this point clear in his comments on my
article.
rational and irrational parts of the soul in his moral psychology, he argues that
kingship provides a model for how an individual should organize reason, spirit,
and appetite. On the other hand, when Aristotle addresses the problem of ethical
education at places in the Ethics, he argues that the regime of kingship provides
superior training of individuals because of the force of command of a truly virtu-
ous king. Since Aristotle believed that different governments inculcate their own
ethical world views, it is reasonable to connect these two models by arguing that
a kingly regime best inculcates a model of the soul in which reason rules like a
king (Pol 1260b8-13, 1289a15-18, 1295a40).
Aristotle believes that the relationship between a king and subject is funda-
mentally similar to the relationship between a father and son. At several places in
the Ethics, Aristotle uses the king/subject or father/son relationship as a model
for the relationship of reason, spirit, and appetite. Thus, Aristotle claims that one
part of the irrational part of the soul, namely,
the appetitive part (§piyumotikÒn) and the desiring part in gen-
eral (˜lvw ÙrektikÒn) share in reason in a way, insofar as it
both listens to reason and obeys it. This is the way in which we
are said to ‘listen to reason’ from fathers or friends, as opposed
to the way in mathematics.20
Aristotle uses a similar metaphor in his explanation of why akrasia caused by
disobedient yumÒw is less shameful than akrasia caused by disobedient §piyum¤a.
In the first kind of akrasia disobedient yumÒw can hear something of reason
(ékoÊein ti toË lÒgou), but it is like hasty servants who rush out of the room
without understanding an order or watch dogs who bark at every noise before
knowing its source; in the second kind of akrasia disobedient §piyum¤a rushes to
its source of pleasure without listening at all (1149a25-30, a35-37). Aristotle’s
example, adapted from Plato’s Republic, views yumÒw as a part of the soul capa-
ble of obedience to reason just like the appetitive part of the soul.21
In his discussion of deliberation and choice, Aristotle uses the model of the
Homeric Kings for the guiding part of the soul (tÚ ≤goÊmenon), for
each of us stops inquiring how to act as soon as he traces the
principle to himself, and within himself to the guiding part; for
this is the part that decides. This is also clear from the ancient
political systems described by Homer; there the kings would
first decide and then announce a decision to the people.
(1113a5-9; cf. 1151a20-26, 1178a2-4, 1177a14-18)
By contrast, Aristotle uses the model of a city which has enacted but does not
obey its good laws to illustrate the nature of the akratic or unrestrained man; the
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20 EN 1102b29-33; cf. 1138b7-15; 1166b19-23, Pol. 1254b3-10, 1260a5-14. At Rhet. 1417a19-
21, as a referee for Ancient Philosophy has pointed out, Aristotle distinguishes mathematical treatises
and Socratic dialogues on whether they have a moral purpose (proa¤resiw).
21 See Republic 375c-e, 403e, 410c-d, 485a, 486c, 503b-c; cf. Pol. 1264b9. For other examples
of the metaphor of ‘listening to reason’ in Aristotle, see EN 1095b10-13, 1105b12-17, 1117a5-9,
1119b11-16, 1139a26, 1169a15-18, 1179b27-28, 1180a10-13; Pol. 1327b30-1328a17.
bad man (ponhrÒw) is instead like a city which obeys its enacted laws, but the
laws are bad (1152a19-25). Although Aristotle does not extend the metaphor to
the nature of the s≈frvn or temperate man, presumably he is one whose reason
has enacted the proper laws for the desires to follow, and the desires do so obedi-
ently, like a subject obeying a king (1117b22-23, 1118a23-27, 1118b2-8).
Although these examples of the ruling part of the soul are only ‘metaphors’
which Aristotle uses to illuminate the proper ordering of the parts of the soul, in
his discussion of ethical education in EN x 9 Aristotle considers the real problem
a city or family faces with respect to authority and training in virtue. In the last
chapter of the Ethics, Aristotle considers the efficacy of ethical speeches (lÒgoi),
and somewhat pessimistically concludes that only force keeps the many in line,
but for those who have been brought to love what is noble or shun what is shame-
ful, there may be hope (1179b4-16). The problem is that learning to love what is
noble is difficult and goes against what is easy and pleasant. Therefore, the ques-
tion turns on whether an effective system of ethical education ought to be the
responsibility of the family or the city. Although Aristotle grants that there are
advantages to education within the household, he writes that
Someone who is to be good must be finely brought up and
habituated, and then must live in decent practices, doing base
actions neither willingly nor unwillingly. And this will be true
if his life follows some sort of reason (noËw) and correct order
that prevails on him. Now a father’s instructions lack this
power to prevail and compel; and so in general do the instruc-
tions of an individual man, unless he is a king or something
like that. (1180a14-21)
In the sequel, it is true, Aristotle goes on to endorse a form of public ethical edu-
cation which is supported by education in the family. But it appears that Aristotle
makes such a point only because of the practical problem of finding kingly indi-
viduals.22 On a practical level, it may be unrealistic to expect every regime to
possess a virtuous king just like it would be unrealistic to assume that every
father is a good guide for his sons or every soul places reason firmly in command
over the desires. But such matters of practicality do not detract from the best
model. It is best that reason rules the desires and a father rules his children like a
virtuous king rules his subjects. Since kingship provides the model for virtue in
the soul and the most effective means of inculcating virtue, one can see a reason
why EN viii 10 claims that kingship is the best regime.
The question of practicality helps deflate an objection that might be raised
against my claim that kingship is the best regime of the Ethics. The Politics
acknowledges the rarity of kingly regimes because of the historical changes in
8
22 At 1180a30-31, Aristotle favors private family education when common care is neglected in
one’s city, but he does not state the cause of this public neglect. I suspect it is the result of the rarity of
virtuous individuals.
23 As he puts it at one point, ‘Royal governments do not occur any more now, but if ever monar-
Greece and emphasizes the civic republicanism of the polis.23 But as readers of
the Politics are well aware, there is a fundamental difference between the ques-
tion of what is the best constitution for most people and what is the best constitu-
tion without qualification (1288b22-40, 1295a25-35, 1325b33-40). There are
numerous places in the Ethics where Aristotle’s discussion naturally leads one to
assume that he has a sort of civic republicanism in mind as the best regime, for
instance in his discussions of political courage, political charity towards the com-
munity, political justice, or political friendship (1116a17-b3, 1122b22-25,
1123a2-7, 1134a25-b17, 1167a27-b4). To claim that kingship is the best regime
of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics does not force one to claim that the model of a
civic republic is a bad regime or that political justice or political friendship are
irrelevant (even if they have no place in a royal regime). Rather, both timoc-
racy—the regime modeled on brotherhood in which people take turns ruling and
being ruled and so exercise political justice (1161a4-9, 1161a25-30)—and king-
ship are correct forms of government, but nonetheless EN viii 10 claims that
kingship is the best regime, even if presumably it is a rare one.
IV. The Universal Best Regime of the Ethics
There remains one passage which seems to be in conflict with EN viii 10’s
claim that kingship is the best regime. In EN v 7, Aristotle claims that
The things that are just not by nature but according to human
enactment are not everywhere the same since regimes are not
the same everywhere; nonetheless, there is only one regime
which is everywhere best according to nature. (1135a3-5)
Although clearly Aristotle is talking about the nature of the best regime in this
passage, he neither identifies what that regime is nor is it certain that he has in
mind the ranking scheme of the Politics. I wish to argue that the regime that Aris-
totle has in mind at 1135a5 is the pambasile¤a or absolute kingship discussed in
the Politics, and if I am correct, then 1135a5 supports my claim that kingship is
the best regime of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The main problem with
endorsing any regime as being ‘the one best everywhere’ is that Aristotle
believes that different regimes are suited for different places and different kinds
of peoples (Pol 1287b37-1288a5, 1281b32, 1296a19). But the regime of pam-
basile¤a in which an individual’s virtue is so superior that it is incomparable
wherever that person resides is the exception.24 Or as Aristotle puts it in the Poli-
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chies arise, they are rather tyrannies because kingship is rule over willing subjects but with
sovereignty over greater matters, but men of equal quality are numerous and no one is so outstanding
as to fit the magnitude and dignity of the office’ (Pol. 1313a4-8); cf. 1252b19-23, 1286b10-23,
1297b24-29. For the same reason, Aristotle also points out that tyrannies are far less common in his
time (1304b15-23).
24 Vander Waerdt 1985b, 266 notes: ‘the king’s virtue is incomparable (mØ sumblhtÆ, 1284a6-
7) to that of his subjects not because it exceeds all of theirs, taken together, but because it differs in
e‰dow (cf. 1259b10-17, b36-8). Consequently the argument that the multitude might make against
those who claim to rule on the basis of merit or wealth—that the people taken together are more vir-
tics,
When it comes about that there is either a family or some one
individual that differs from the others among him in virtue so
greatly that his virtue exceeds that of all the others, then it is
just for this family to be the royal family or this individual king
and sovereign over all things… It is not proper to call upon him
to take his turn as a subject; for it is not in the order of nature
(oÈ går p°fuke) for the part to overtop the whole, but the man
that is so exceptionally outstanding has come to overtop the
whole community. Hence it only remains for the community to
obey such a man, and for him to be sovereign not in turn but
absolutely.25
In sum, if there is such a thing as a ‘regime which is best everywhere’ it must be
Aristotle’s pambasile¤a or kingship over all, because the virtue of such a single
individual trumps the claims of all other individual claims to rule.
My interpretation of 1135a5 clashes with two pre-eminent readings of the pas-
sage, and showing why my interpretation is superior helps to elucidate the pas-
sage in question. For instance, Miller 1995 has argued that the ‘one best regime
according to nature’ is the model to which legislation in all other regimes—no
matter where—ought to approximate (Kraut 2002, 130-132, espouses a similar
idea). The first paragraph of Nature, Justice, and Rights reads:
Aristotle maintains that there is only one constitution which is
everywhere according to nature the best (EN v 7 1135a5)…
The best constitution serves as a standard by which politicians
can establish, preserve, and reform different political institu-
tions appropriate to a wide variety of social circumstances.
(Miller 1995, vii; cf. 67, 75-76, 122, 127, 183-188, 191)
That one regime which most promotes human nature and allows for each and
every citizen to flourish and be happy is the ideal state of Pol vii-viii, and Miller
believes all other regimes should aspire to such a naturalistic ideal.26
The main problem with Miller’s reading of 1135a5 is that it ascribes to Aristo-
tle belief in a regulative ideal which seems foreign to the spirit of Aristotelian
philosophy and contrary to the discussion of the various forms of the best regime
in the Politics and Ethics. It would appear to be an axiom of Aristotelian practical
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tuous or wealthy than the few or one, even if less so taken singly (1283a42-b35)—cannot apply in
this case, since the king’s heroic virtue, being different in e‰dow, simply is incomparable to theirs’.
25 Pol. 1288a15-19, a25-29; see also 1283b20-24, 1284b26-34, 1284a3-14, 1284b25-34,
1325b10-14. Scholars have expressed doubt about the possible existence of such an individual. For
instance, Mulgan 1977, 87, 88 claims that this discussion is ‘purely hypothetical’ and only provides a
‘limiting case’ to Aristotle’s discussion of regimes (cf. Simpson 1998, 192 and Miller 1995, 234-
239).
26 Indeed, Miller 1995, 252 even goes so far as to suggest that the regime described in Pol. vii-
viii, ‘though possible in principle, was unattainable in practice on Aristotle’s view’, and elsewhere he
describes it as merely a ‘regulative ideal’ (Miller 1996, 894-895).
27 More precisely, the question turns on whether pantaxoË (1135a5) should be understood parti-
philosophy that, contra the idealism which Aristotle imputes to Plato, the good is
an object of practice—namely, it is a praktikÒn (1096b33-37, 1095a16-17; cf.
Pol 1265a17-18, 1325b38-39). In EN iii 3, Aristotle points out that we deliberate
about things within our control and which are attainable by action, but more
specifically, attainable by our action: he writes ‘no Lacedaemonian deliberates
about the best form of government (êrista politeÊointo) for Scythia, but each
group of individuals deliberates about the actions they themselves can do’
(1112a28-30). No one deliberates about regulative ideas, but about what can be
done in one’s own time and place. In sum, Miller’s vision of an ideal state which
can serve as a model for all regimes ignores the extent to which local considera-
tions determine what is best for each place.
A second interpretation of 1135a5 which I wish to consider is that of Mulhern
1972, who has argued that the claim that ‘there is one best regime everywhere
according to nature’ could be interpreted in two different senses depending on
how one understands the placement of the quantifier ‘everywhere’.27 The first
sense—similar to how Miller reads the passage—interprets Aristotle as claiming
that no matter where you are, the best regime is a regulative ideal which gives
guidance to the regime under which you live, because there is one regime which
is best by nature everywhere. The second sense—which Mulhern endorses—
interprets Aristotle as claiming that in each and every place there is one and only
one regime which is best for that place. In support of the latter reading, Mulhern
argues that throughout the Politics, Aristotle is ‘practically minded’, or con-
stantly occupied by the conditions under which his intended audience operate.
But for such an audience, namely, an audience of legislators hoping to stabilize
their regimes and ameliorate the most pernicious elements of faction, elevated
rhetoric about a ‘city on a hill’ is useless.
If one understands Aristotle’s best regime to be a sort of constitutional republic
or aristocracy which presupposes things like leisure and rights for its citizenry,
material wealth, and a certain refinement of culture and education, then Mulhern
is correct to say that such a regulative ideal is irrelevant to the great majority of
legislators in the world. But Aristotle’s virtuous royal ruler towers above all
members of his or her city—if not the world as a whole—and it would be impos-
sible to imagine any place where such an individual would find an equal with
whom to share rule. Mulhern’s criticisms of a regulative ideal undermine
Miller’s assertion that there is a constitutional republic which can serve as a
model for all legislators, but they do not undermine the claim that in extraordi-
nary circumstances there may be someone whose virtue justifies a claim to rule
wherever that individual is. In sum, not only is Aristotle’s account of that ‘one
regime which is everywhere best according to nature’ consistent with the claim
that the best regime of the Ethics is kingship; it seems that the only plausible
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tively rather than collectively. Although Aubenque 1980 once supported such a reading, he has more
recently accepted the collective reading (see Aubenque 1998, 43n14).
28 As Destrée 2000, 226-227 has pointed out, a weakness of Mulhern’s own interpretation of
interpretation of 1135a5 must identify the best regime under discussion with an
absolute kingship based in virtue.28
Conclusion: The Intended Audience of the Nicomachean Ethics
In Nicomachean Ethics viii 10 Aristotle claims that kingship is the best regime,
but at first glance he appears to present very little argumentation for that claim
beyond the assertion that kingship is the opposite of tyranny. I have tried to show
that such a claim derives support from other passages in the Ethics. One criterion
which Aristotle mentions for ranking regimes in the Ethics, namely, the notion of
virtue, supports the claim that kingship is the best regime. Further, the king/sub-
ject relationship provides a model for the transformation and ordering of the soul
and helps elucidate EN viii 10. Put slightly differently, since the kingly individ-
ual is the most virtuous one, there must be a sense in which the kingly regime is
best, regardless of the possibility of its implementation. My argument concedes
that there is much discussion of political activity between equals in the Ethics,
but that is just to acknowledge that regimes which foster civic participation can
be correct regimes without necessarily also being the best regimes. Finally, I
have argued that the identity of Aristotle’s enigmatic discussion of a universal
best regime is most plausibly construed as kingship, because only a kingship
based on the absolute supremacy of an heroically virtuous man justifies that
man’s rule regardless of local conditions or particular circumstances. Such is my
main argumentation.
Nonetheless, a paradox remains, one which has been well-posed by Vander
Waerdt 1985b, 249-253. If Aristotle believes that virtue is developed through
civic participation and reciprocal rule, and virtue is a criterion of the best regime,
then how can the regime of kingship—which denies subjects the opportunity of
political participation—ever be considered the best regime? Vander Waerdt
answers his own paradox within the context of the Politics by claiming that the
paide¤a prescribed in the Politics is a better source of ethical inculcation than
civic participation, but its leisure presupposes citizens whose political problems
are resolved by an absolute king. Such a generally accessible paide¤a—based
primarily in the musical and poetic arts rather than the contemplative sciences—
provides a way to bring virtue and happiness to the people of a regime (Vander
Waerdt 1985b, 261-264; cf. Lord 1978 and 1982). Unfortunately, although Van-
der Waerdt’s plausible suggestion works well in the case of the Politics, where
Aristotle understands philosophy primarily as generally accessible paide¤a, the
solution will not work for the Ethics. The account of philosophy in EN x is that of
theoretical contemplation accessible only to a very few sages who in a sense live
outside the framework of Politics. Very few subjects living under the regime of
the pambasile¤a would be able to achieve such intellectual mastery because of
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1135a5 is that it seems indistinguishable from that of the Sophistical interlocutors with whom Aristo-
tle is arguing in EN v 7.1134b24-27.
29 EN 1179b7-1180a18. On the question of the intended audience of the Ethics, see further Tes-
the arduous and complex nature of such philosophizing. Perhaps a consideration
of the intended audience of the Nicomachean Ethics can provide an alternative
solution to the paradox of inculcating virtue without civic participation.
Although there is debate about precisely who is the intended audience of Aris-
totle’s Nicomachean Ethics, certainly one plausible candidate is the class of those
good-natured and noble-loving young men whom Aristotle claims can be
effected by exhortations of virtue.29 Ethical speeches have no effect on those who
have not been raised to take pleasure and pain in the right sources, and those who
have already reached the pinnacle of ethical and intellectual virtue hardly need
the guidance of another. And yet between those two extremes, there lies those
individuals—primarily young men—whose souls are capable of listening obedi-
ently to the advice of their elders. The Hesiod which Aristotle invokes at the
opening of the Ethics identifies such an audience:
He who grasps everything himself is best of all;
He is noble also who listens to one who has spoken well;
But he who neither grasps it himself nor takes to heart what he
hears from another is a useless man.30
Men of noble natures who have not yet grasped everything for themselves are old
enough to have experience of the relevant matters of ethics and politics, but they
still need the exhortation of a superior.
Aristotle’s support for kingship as the best regime may be explainable on the
basis of the rhetorical structure of the Nicomachean Ethics itself. Just like king-
ship provides a model for the ordering of the soul and ethical instruction, it also
provides a model for the relationship between an author and his or her readers.
Some works, like Platonic dialogues, seem to invite their readers to pick up loose
threads in the argument so that the readers become interlocutors in Socratic dia-
logue. Other works, like Lucretius’ De rerum natura, seek to sweeten difficult
words with poetic honey, to make them more palatable. What seems stylistically
distinctive about Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is its authoritative voice which
instructs, as if, from the professor’s lectern.31 But the lecturer’s classroom is not
a democracy in which all voices are equal and one learns through challenging the
lecturer. Rather, the author of the Nicomachean Ethics speaks to its intended lis-
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sitore 1996, 9-23 and Bodëús 1993, 83-122. In Lockwood unpublished, I argue that the interlocutors
of Aristotle’s Ethics are his contemporaries in the Academy. If that is correct, then the intended audi-
ence of the Ethics is not only noble-loving young men, but noble-loving young philosophers.
30 EN 1095b10-13, Irwin 1999 trans.; cf. Works and Days, 293, 295-297. Since Aristotle intro-
duces Hesiod’s poetry with the imperative ékousãtv, it seems that he is addressing not someone
who grasps things himself but rather one who listens well.
31 It seems likely that the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics have different authorial voices and
intended audiences. See further Allan 1961, 304-305 318, who suggests that the Nicomachean Ethics
is related to the Eudemian Ethics like Descartes’ 1641 Meditations are related to his 1644 Principles
of Philosophy. See also Pakaluk 1998, who finds the Eudemian Ethics on the whole more egalitarian
than the Nicomachean.
32 Owens 1978, xi claimed of Aristotle’s authorial voice that ‘The Stagirite is a splendid talker,
teners like a king to his subjects.32 Because the Ethics is a practical treatise con-
cerned with the guidance of those who are not completely virtuous, it is struc-
tured in such a fashion to speak authoritatively to its obedient auditors. The
regime of kingship provides the perfect model for such a discourse, independent
of any questions about politics or the establishment of different regimes in partic-
ular cities, and my thesis helps explain the authorial voice of the Nicomachean
Ethics. As noted at the outset, the Ethics and the Politics are two parts of a
greater whole and both are practical or directed towards action. But whereas the
Politics is ‘practical’ with respect to the implementation of different regimes in
different places, the Ethics is practical with respect to the implementation of
complete virtue in its appropriate audience. As the Politics notes, the rule one
exercises over free and equal men must first be learned by being ruled (Pol
1277b7-10; cf. 1332b12-27, 1333a2-3).33
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